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UNINSURED MOTORIST ARBITRATION*
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION PROVISION

Most attorneys who are familiar with arbitration provisions of
uninsured motorist endorsements to automobile liability insurance policies have encountered them under distressing situations
such as the following: An insured has an automobile collision
with an uninsured motorist; he suffers property damage to his
automobile and personal injuries; under the terms of his
uninsured motorist endorsement to his insurance policy, he is
allowed to recover the cash value of these damages from his own
insurance company if the uninsured motorist was at fault;1 he
and his insurance company disagree as to the issues of liability of
the uninsured motorist and the amount of his damages, and for
that reason no settlement is reached. As a result of this siutation,
the insured hires an attorney in order to sue his insurer for his
damages. After reading the uninsured motorist endorsement, the
attorney informs the insured that he cannot sue due to the
existence of the arbitration clause which is uniformly inserted in
uninsured motorist endorsements. This is the first time that the
insured realizes that his right to sue under the endorsement,
carrying with it the 7th Amendment right of jury trial, has been
contracted away. His reaction is often anger and frustration.
One section is common to all arbitration provisions in uninsured motorist endorsements. It provides that, should the insured
and his insurer disagree on the question of the tortfeasor's
liability or the amount of damages, then, on written demand of
either party, the disputed matters are to be settled by arbitration. 2
*The research for the sections treating the scope of the arbitration provision and the loss of the
right to arbitrate was compiled by Robert C. Brown, a recent graduate of the University of New
Mexico Law School and currently an attorney in Casa Grande, Arizona.
I. 1966 Standard Endorsement, Part I: Coverage. The standard form of uninsured motorist
coverage referred to in this section is the language issued by the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, Standard Form, entitled "Family
Protection Coverage Endorsement Against Uninsured Motorists." Most of the major automobile
insurers throughout the United States use the same language.
2. 1966 Standard Endorsement, Part VI: Additional Conditions, F. "Arbitration. If any person
making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to
recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of the amount
of payment which may be owing under this endorsement, then, upon written demand of either,
the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by

January 19731

UNINSURED MOTORIST ARBITRA TION

The crucial question is whether the insured is always bound to
arbitrate even though he would rather settle his differences with
the insurer by court litigation.
A. Reasonsfor adoption of the UninsuredMotorist Endorsement
and its Arbitration Clause.
The uninsured motorist endorsement, first adopted in 1954,
was a voluntary response by the insurance industry to the
problem of compensating the innocent victims of the financially
irresponsible motorist. It apparently quieted the clamor in
legislatures throughout the country for an answer to this problem. Today uninsured motorist coverage is (by3statute in all 50
policy.
states) to be offered with each automobile
The adoption of the endorsement, however, caused a serious
problem for insurance companies. It became obvious that, in
many cases, they would find themselves in disputes with their
own policyholders over the legal liability of the uninsured
motorist and the extent of the insured's injuries. If the two of
them could not agree, the company and the insured would find
themselves involved in a court litigation in which the insurer
would have to take the position that the uninsured motorist was
not negligent. But the same automobile collision also gives rise to
a potential third party claim by the uninsured motorist against
the policyholder. In this second action, the insurance company
must reverse its position and prove that the uninsured driver was
negligent. This led to a potential conflict of interest, and certainly
created an anomalous 4 situation, one that the insurance companies desired to resolve.
A second problem for insurers was that if they had to meet the
claimant in court, they would be in the impractical and undesirable position of being the named defendant in the litigation.
Thus, aware of the successful experience with arbitration under
5
Inter-Company agreements, insurance companies decided that
This clause is used by most
any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this endorsement."
Company which uses rules
major insurers. One major exception is the State Farm Insurance
131 infra.
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an arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist endorsements
would solve these problems as well. Their decision has since
led
to an unprecedented rash of litigation testing that policy provision.
B. Disenchantmentwith the Arbitration Provision.
The uninsured motorist endorsement for the first time brought
the concept of arbitration to the general public and to
the
majority of the Bar. The response was not an overwhelming
acceptance of the process. While many reasons, including
the
hostility of the courts, the ignorance of the plaintiffs Bar, and
the
nature of the arbitral process, have been given for the problem, 6
the basic difficulty is that the factors which made the process
so
attractive in the inter-company area are not present in
the
uninsured motorists disputes.
When viewed from the position of the insurer there are valid
reasons for utilizing arbitration in the resolution of uninsured
motorists disputes. For instance, to the insurer there are
a
substantial number of disputes which need to be disposed of
in
an economical and efficient manner. In addition there
is a
continuing relationship with the insured which needs to
be
protected from the bitterness associated with protracted litigation.
However, from the viewpoint of the individual insured and his
attorney there are not the same compelling reasons to arbitrate.
They have no volume problem, and, in fact, can use
the
company's defense backlog to their own advantage in some cases
to increase settlement value. They have only one chance
to
recover, and if they lose there is normally no subsequent case
in
which the arbitral process can work to their advantage. As
a
result, to place all of their chances in a single arbitration
proceeding and to forfeit their resort to appellate review is
to
severely limit their chances of recovery. 7
Assuming then, for whatever reason, that an insured would
rather litigate his differences with his insurer under the uninsured
motorist endorsement, the question becomes whether he can
sue
despite the existence in the endorsement of the arbitration clause.
6. McLaughlin, Arbitration Under Uninsured Motorist Insurance,
473 Ins. L. J. 353 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as McLaughlin].
7. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
arbitral process to the insured will
be given at pages 238-47, infra.
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C. The issue of enforceability under 'present controversy" type
statutes.
The effect of legislation and judicial decisions interpreting the
enforceability of arbitration cluases in uninsured motorist endorsements should be analyzed with respect to a long-standing
8
reluctance in the United States to enforce such agreements. This
reluctance stems from the English common law which precluded
specific performance of arbitration agreements. The common law
rule has been attributed both to the English judges' reluctance to
force parties to adjudicate rights without the safeguards of a
court of law, 9 and to a less charitable judicial disinclination to
relinquish disputes to arbitrators at a time when judges' incomes
10
were derived mostly from fees for the causes they heard.
Because of the common law, American courts will not enforce
arbitration agreements if one of the parties desires to litigate
unless the common law is modified by legislation. 1 '
Before 1971, New Mexico's arbitration statute had modified
the common law only to sanction agreements to arbitrate existing
disputes.' 2 It was generally assumed that an arbitration clause in
an uninsured motorist endorsement under this statute would be
held to be unenforceable because the disputes to arise would not
be "present controversies" at the time of the signing of the
uninsured motorist endorsement agreement, but instead they
would be future disputes. Although no New Mexico case has ever
considered the question of the enforceability of the arbitration
provision in the uninsured motorist endorsement, two of eighteen
13
states having "present controversy" type arbitration statutes
8. A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage 176-77 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A.
Widiss]. See also Restatement of Contracts, § 550 (1932); A. Corbin, Contracts, § 1433 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as A. Corbin]; McLaughlin, supra, note 6.
9. Scott v. Avery, [1856125 Eng. Rep. 112.
10. A. Corbin, supra note 8; J. Cohen, Commercial Arbitration 226-41 (1918) [hereinafter cited
as J. Cohen].
1I. 5 Am. Jur.2d, Arbitration andA ward § 36 (1962); 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941); 7 C.J.S., Arbitration
§ 33a (1937); J. Cohen, supra, note 10; J. Morse, Arbitration and Award 89-96 (1872); 9 Williston
on Contracts 443-44 (3rd ed. Jaeger) (1967) [hereinafter cited as 9 Williston on Contracts); Sayer,
Development of CommercialA rbitrationLaw, 37 Yale L. J. 595, 603-5 (1928).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-1 (1953): "All litigants in the State of New Mexico shall have the
right, whenever they so desire, to terminate their suits, in whatever condition they may be, in any
court of this state, by means of arbitrators, according to the provisions of this chapter."
13. Ten states have "present controversy" type arbitration statutes exactly like the old New
Mexico statute cited above; Ala. Code, tit. 7, ch. 19, § § 829-30 (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (R.
Civ. Pro.) ch. 16, Rule 109 (1963); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, ch. 57, § 5701 (1953); Idaho Code Ann.
Vol. 2,ch. 9, § 7-901 (1947); Iowa Code § 679.1 and .2 (1966); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 93-201-1
(Repl. Vol. 1966); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 25-2103 (1964); N.C. Stat. Ann. § 1-544 (1951); N.D.
Cent. Code § 32-29-01 (1960); Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-1 (1953). Eight other states have "present
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have expressly held in court decisions that the clause is
unenforceable. 14 One of these, Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance Company, held the. arbitration provision voidable and against public policy in that it both denied a party his
right to have his disputes determined in a court of law and
tended to oust the court of its jurisdiction.15
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently held an agreement
to arbitrate a future dispute voidable and unenforceable as
against public policy in State ex rel. Duke City Lumber Co. v.
Wood.16 The agreement in issue concerned a secured loan and a
provision providing for binding arbitration of all disputes under
the contract. The court held that the parties had not clearly
contemplated all of the disputes that later developed under the
contract. For that reason, the agreement was held unenforceable
under New Mexico's then "present controversy" type arbitration
statute. Citing Corbon on Contracts, the court concluded with
this policy argument:17
It seems, therefore, that the supposed vice of general and unlimited
arbitration agreements lay in the fact that parties try to bind
themselves to avoid the courts and to submit to private arbitration
issues that at the time they do not have clearly in mind, which after
they have arisen one of them is no longer willing to submit to the
private arbitrators.

Despite the existence of New Mexico's "present controversy"
type arbitration statute, two New Mexico State District Courts
have held that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist
endorsement is enforceable because of the existence of the trial
controversy" type statutes with the exception that these states also have either specific legislation
or rules that specifically speak to the Uninsured Motorist issue: Ga. Code Ann., Book 4,§ 7-201
(1953); Kan. Stat. Ann. ch. 6, Art. 2. § 5-201 (1963); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 417.010 (1963); Miss
Code Ann., tit. 3, ch. I,§ 279 (1956); Mo. Stat. Ann., § 435.020 (1959); Tenn. Code Ann., ch. 5,
§ 23-501 (1956); Va. Code Ann., ch. 22, § 8-503 (1950); W.Va. Code Ann., § 55-10-1 (1966). Three
other states have no arbitration statute: Oklahoma, Vermont and South Dakota. In two of these
states the courts have held that the arbitration terms in the uninsured motorist endorsement are
not enforceable [Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 354, P.2d 1085, 79 A.L.R.2d 1245 (Okla.
1960)], and it seems likely that in the absence of legislation, courts in the third state would also
continue to apply the English common law rule.
14. Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance Company, 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873
(1965); Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969). One other case, in a state which
has since changed its arbitration statute, has also held the arbitration provision in the uninsured
motorist endorsement unenforceable because it applied to a future dispute: Indiana Insurance
Company v. Noble, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Indiana Insurance Co. v. Noble].
15. 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965).
16. 81 N.M. 285, 466 P.2d 562(1970).
17. Id. at 287.
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de novo statute. 18 This statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-107
(Repl. 1972) allows any agrieved party to an arbitration award in
an uninsured motorist case the right to appeal to a district court
for a trial de novo. Both judges, held, therefore, that this statute
eliminated the policy argument against the enforcement of
arbitration agreements for future disputes because the court is
not ousted of its jurisdiction. Also, as long as this New Mexico
trial de novo statute remains, the policy of the finality of the
arbitration award is expressly abrogated for uninsured motorist
arbitrations.
D. The issue of enforceability under the Uniform ArbitrationAct.
In 1971, the New Mexico legislature adopted the Uniform
19
Arbitration Act which repealed the old arbitration statute and
added New Mexico to the growing number of states that have
adopted the so-called "modem" arbitration statutes allowing
parties to enforce agreements to arbitrate both present and future
disputes. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-9 (Supp. 1971) states:
22-3-9. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. The Uniform Arbitration
Act (22-3-9 to 22-3-31) also applies to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or between their respective
representatives unless otherwise provided in the agreement.

This section is copied from § 1 of the Uniform Arbitration Act as
approved in 1955 by the National Conference of Commissioners
20
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association. As
2'
states.
eleven
in
of 1972, this section has been adopted verbatim
Thirteen other states have arbitration statutes substantially
analogous to the Uniform Act;2 2 thus, there are a total of
twenty-four "modern" arbitration states.
18. Order, Matajcich, et al. v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Companies, el al., Civil
No. 13844 (D. McKinley County, July 29, 1971); Order, Butler v. Travelers Insurance Company,
Civil No. A 51489 (D. Bernalillo County, August 13, 1971).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-1 to -8 (1953).
20. Uniform Arbitration Act (U.L.A.) § 1 (1955 version).
21. Alas. Stat. Tit. 9 ch. 43, § 10-180 (Cum. Supp. 1968); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1501 (Supp.
1971); Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 10, § 101 (Smith-H urd 1966); Ind. Stat. Ann. Vol. 2, Pt. 3, ch. 2 § 3-227
(Supp. 1971); Me. Tit. 14, § 5927 (Supp. 1972); Ann. Code of Md. Art. 7, § 1 (1957); Mass. Ann.
Laws, ch. 251, § 1(1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.08 (Supp. 1972); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-9 (Supp.
1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 15 (1971); Wyo. Stat. Ann., ch. 37, § 1-1048.3 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
22. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-511 (Supp. 1971); Cal. Code Civ. Prac. Tit. 9, §§ 1280-94 (West. Supp.
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The only requirement which the Uniform Arbitration Act
seems to impose for an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute in
order for it to be enforceable is a written provision in a contract.
Although, no New Mexico appellate decision has considered the
enforceability of an uninsured motorist endorsement arbitration
provision under the Uniform Act, it is often assumed that in
modern arbitration states such a provision is strictly enforceable
at the will of one of the parties.2 3 Indeed, there is a modern trend
to enforce these provisions in some modern arbitration states
because of the strong public policy favoring arbitration.2 4 Despite
this assumption of enforceability, however, a compelling argument can be made against the enforceability of the uninsured
motorist endorsement arbitration provision because it has not
been voluntarily agreed upon by the insured.
Questions concerning the existence in a contract of an arbitration provision are decided by a court.2 5 The court should
determine whether there was mutuality of assent. It is stated as
the general rule:
To be enforceable, the arbitration agreement must have all the
elements of a contract. Without mutuality of assent, there can be no
6
enforceable arbitration contract.2

To determine mutuality of assent with respect to an arbitration
provision in a modern arbitration state, the character of the
Uniform Arbitration Act legislation should be considered in light
of the Commissioners' Prefatory Note which says: "This Act
1969); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 682.01 (Supp. 1972); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 658-1 (1955); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 600.5001 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542.1 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-1 (1964); N.Y.
Civ. Prac. § 7501 (McKinney 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.01 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 33.210-.340 (1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 5, ch. I, § 1 (1963); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.04.010
(1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.01 (1957).
23. Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 504 Ins. L. J. 17, 20-21
(1965); Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 34 Ins. Counsel J. 57, 87-88 (1967); McGaughlin, supra note 6 at 356-58.
24. Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970); Van Horn
v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1968); Norton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 373 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Bohlman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1965); Liberty
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Loring, 91 11. App. 2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 418 (1968); Stagray v.Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, I Mich. App. 321, 136 N.W.2d 51 (1965).
25. Uniform Arbitration Act, (U.L.A.), § 2 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-10 (Supp.
1971). See also 9 Williston on Contracts, supra note 1I,at 477; Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967): United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navagation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) [hereinafter cited as United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navagation Co.]; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corporation, 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (latter four cases concerned with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § I et seq., which is substantially analogous to the Uniform Arbitration Act).
26. 9 Williston on Contracts, supra, note 11,at 472-77.
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covers voluntary written agreements to arbitrate. '27 It has been
stated that the intent of the New Mexico legislators who adopted
the Uniform Arbitration Act was to also adopt this "voluntary
agreement" language of the Prefatory Note. 28 In other Uniform
Act states in which there is an absence of specific legislative
intent underlying provisions of the Uniform Act, it has been held
that the records of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws could be examined to determine the intent of the
Act. 2 9 If the language of the Uniform Act, then, is combined with

this expressed intent of the drafters, the issue of enforceability is
not only a question of whether the arbitration provision is in a
written contract, but also whether the provision is the result of a
voluntary agreement. The real question to be decided by appellate courts interpreting a state's Uniform Arbitration Act or other
modern arbitration statute, is whether the uninsured motorist
endorsement is, in fact, such a voluntary agreement.
Appellate court decisions interpreting either a modern arbitration state statute or the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 0 which is
substantially similar to the modern statutes, seem to assume that
a party's decision to use arbitration must result from a voluntary
agreement. 31 One of these decisions, Allstate Insurance Company
v. Schmitka,32 held that an arbitration provision would not be
enforced unless there was a clear showing that the parties
voluntarily agreed to such arbitration.
Some state statutes have provisions which require a voluntary
27. 9 U.L.A. 76.
28. Interview with Turner Branch, Attorney at Law, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, February
23, 1972. Mr. Branch is a New Mexico legislator in the New Mexico House of Representatives; he
was also the sponsor of the Bill to adopt the Uniform Arbitration Act in the 1971 legislative
session.
29. School District No. 46 v. Del Bianco. 68 Ill. App.2d 145, 215 N.E.2d 25, 29 (1966).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
31. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, note 25, at 582;
Retail Clerks International Assoc. v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 341 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1965);
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Antorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1942); In the
Matter of Arbitration between International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers ,
AFL-CIO and Westinghouse Electric Corp., 48 F.R.D. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Schmitka, 12 Cal. App. 3d 59, 90 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Schmitka); G. & N. Construction Co. v. Kirpatrovsky, 181 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1966);
Podolsky v. Raskin, 294 IIl. 443, 128 N.E. 534 (1920); Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J.S. 157, 148
A.2d 497 (1959); American Silk Mills Corp. v. Meinhard-Commercial Corp., 35 A.D.2d 197, 315
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1970); Arbitration in the Matter of Writers Guild of A.E. and Procter Pr., I N.Y.2d
305. 135 N.E.2d 204 (1956); Glassner v. Bressler, 281 N.Y. 218, 22 N.E.2d 347 (1939); Goldman v.
Board of Education, 5 Ohio App.2d 49, 213 N.E.2d 826 (1965); Keiser v. Berks County, 253 Pa.
167, 97 A. 1067 (1916); Riverton Valley Elec. Assn. v. Pacific Power & L. Co., 391 P.2d 489 (Wyo.
1964).
32. 12 Cal. App.3d 59, 90 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1970).
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agreement on the arbitration clause by an insured in order for the
clause to be enforceable against the insured in an uninsured
motorist dispute. For instance, some states require that the
parties sign, acknowledge, execute bonds, file or otherwise duly.
execute contracts in order to create an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate; several of these states have additional legislation that
necessitates compliance with two or more of these prerequisites. 33
Such a procedure demonstrates a strong public policy that the
insured be aware of the arbitration clause before he purchases
the uninsured motorist coverage.
One of the rare judicial discussions of these special requirements occurred in a recent Rhode Island case involving the
enforceability of the Uninsured Motorist endorsement arbitration
clause. 34 The Rhode Island arbitration statute requires that an
agreement to arbitrate must be "clearly written and expressed
and contained in a separate paragraph immediately before the
testimonium clause of the signatures of the parties. 35 In light of
this statute the Supreme Court stated: 36
We believe that the legislature in promulgating this condition
reflected the concern of this court as to the adoption of binding
arbitration of future disputes and consequently felt that, should
such a clause be included in an agreement, it was to be placed in
such a location that its chances of being seen by the parties who
would be bound hereby would be enhanced. (Emphasis added).

Since insurance policies are rarely, if ever, signed acknowledged,
filed or duly executed, it is asserted that in the jurisdictions with
these special requirements the arbitration provision in the
uninsured motorist endorsement is unenforceable.
Because of the danger that the insured almost never voluntarily agrees to the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist
33. Ala. Code, tit. 7, ch. 19, § 831 (1960) (signature requirement); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (R.
Civ. Pro.) ch. 16, Rule 109 (1963) (execution requirement); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann., ch. 909,
§ 52-408 (1960) (execution requirement); Ga. Code Ann., Book 4, § 7-201 (1953) (signature
requirement); Idaho Code Ann. Vol. 2, ch. 9, § 7-903 (1947) (filing requirement); Iowa Code,
§ 679.2 (1966) (signature and acknowledgment requirements); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.0201
(1963) (signature requirement); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 93-201-3 (Repl. Vol. 1966) (filing
requirement); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-2105 (1964) (acknowldegment requirement); N.D. Cent.
Code § 32-29-01 (1960) (acknowledgment and signature requirements); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.,
§ 10-3-2 (1956) (execution requirement); Tenn. Code Ann., ch. 5, § 23-506 (1956) (signature or
entry of record); Va. Code Ann., ch. 22§8-503 (1950) (filing requirement); W.Va. Code Ann.,
§ 55-10-2 (1966) (fiiling requirement).
34. Donahue v. Associated Indem. Corp., 227 A.2d 187 (R.I. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Donahue v. Associated Indem. Corp.).
35. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann., § 10-3-2 (1956).
36. Donahue v. Associated Indem. Corp., at 190.
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endorsement,3 7 five states have statutory rules which explicitly
exclude the use of arbitration to preclude a claimant's right to sue
39
under the endorsement. 38 Furthermore, six other state statutes
4°
and one ruling by a state insurance commissioner expressly
prohibit insurers from specifying the use of arbitration in their
uninsured motorist endorsements.
An extensive examination in all states discloses no appellate
decision where a state court was required to face the issue of
whether the arbitration terms in the uninsured motorist endorsement satisfied the voluntary agreement requirement of that
state's arbitration statute. Until now, most insured claimants
attempting to avoid arbitration have not questioned the validity
of the clause with respect to the necessary voluntary agreement or
mutuality of assent. Such a glaring omission is shown in an
appellate decision in New Hampshire, a state with 41a modern
arbitration statute. The decision, Kirouac v. Healey, involved
appellant seeking to avoid the enforcement of the arbitration
clause on the ground it deprived him of his constitutional right to
trial by jury. In dictum, the Court made this interesting observation about the necessity of voluntary agreement:
The plaintiff and amici urge that the arbitration privisions of the
policy are invalid, while the insurer contends that they are a
voluntary waiver of the plaintiff's right to jury trial against the
insurer, if not a waiver of all rights of trial in the courts. .

.

. So

far as the record discloses, the plaintiff has agreed to submit, upon
written demand, to arbitration of his claim against the insurer, and
to consider himself bound by the award. American Fidelity Co. v.
Schemel, 103 N.H. 190, 195, 168 A.(2d) 478 and cases cited.
Voluntary agreements to arbitrateare made valid in thisjurisdiction
by statute. RSA Ch. 542, cf Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S. C.
455, 117 S.E.(2d) 867; Boughton v. Farmers' Ins. Exch. (Okla), 354
P.(2d) 1085. The provisions of RSA Ch. 28, supra, permit but do
not require uninsured motorist coverage to include arbitration

37. Infra text at 230.
38. Conn. Ins. Comm'rs Reg. § 38-175a-6(c) (Dec. 19, 1967); Kan. Ins. Dept. Bull. 1968-1
(Apr. 19, 1968); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22.1406(D)(5) (Supp. 1972): Mo. Stat. Ann. § 435.010
(1959); Nev. Laws Ann. ch. 446, § 1(4) (1967).
39. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3233 (Repl. Vol. 1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-407.1(f) (Supp. 1971);
Miss. Code Ann. § 8285-55 (Supp. 1971): S.C. Code § 46-750.37 (Supp. 1971); Va. Code Ann.
38.1-381(g) (1970); W. Va. Code§33-7-31 (g) (Supp. 1971). See also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 307 F.Supp. 743 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 454 P.2d 106 (Nev. 1969).
40. Ky. Dep't of Ins. Order and Reg. I-G-23, issued July 7, 1966 by S. Roy Woodall, Jr.,
Comm'r of Ins.
41. 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962). See the discussion of this case in Note, Enforcement of
Arbitration Provisions in Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1962) [hereinafter
referred to as Enforcement ofArbitration Provisions in Uninsured Motorist Insurance].
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provisions. Cf Va. Code Ann. sec. 38.1-381 (g) (Supp. 1960). There
is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff's acceptance of such
provisions in his policy was anything but voluntary. Hence, he should
be bound by them to the same extent that any party to such an
agreement would be bound. RSA Ch. 542 supra. (Emphasis
42
added.)

Two observations on this case are appropriate. First, the court
said clearly that contracts to arbitrate future disputes are valid
and enforceable. Second, the opinion is equally clear that only
voluntary agreements are valid. The court's statement that there
was no evidence in the record that the insured's agreement was
anything but voluntary is indicative of the fact that counsel for
the insured failed to lay a basis during the trial for raising this
issue on appeal.
Several reasons can be advanced to show that the arbitration
provision in an uninsured motorist endorsement is not a voluntary written agreement. These arise from certain marketing
practices which exist generally in the automobile liability insurance business, and from some conditions related specifically to
the endorsement.
The first and basic reason is that the acceptance by the insured
of a unilaterally drafted arbitration provision within a detailed
multipaged document is not an adequate basis upon which to
forfeit the insured's right to have any controversies judicially
determined. The insurance policy is typical of a contract of
adhesion (and thus should not be enforced in all aspects against
an insured) for the following reasons: 1) Economic necessity
today requires the motorist to carry automobile liability
insurance; 43 2) there is a lack of alternatives in the standard form
(automobile insurance is a "take it or leave it" proposition); 44 3)
One party controls the risks under the contract. 45
Automobile insurance is a "take it or leave it" proposition
because there is no bargaining with the insurance company over
terms. This is due to the great disparity in bargaining power
between the parties. 46 Even if someone had sufficient power to
bargain over the terms of the policy, it is implausible that he
42.
43.
117.
44.
at 185.
45.
46.

Id. at 637-38.
Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions in Uninsured Motorist Insurance, supra note 41, at
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1943); A. Widiss, supra note 8,
A. Widiss, supra note 8, at 190.
Id at 185 and note 4.
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would seek the guidance of an insurance lawyer to interpret for
him the meaning of the arbitration clause; nor do the costs
involved (a premium of usually between $2.00 and $15.00; $5.00
in New Mexico) warrant the economic cost to society of countless
negotiations over the inclusion of such a term in the policy. 47 One
writer has vehemently asserted the following:
When "take it or leave it" contracts and standardized order forms,
which anyone with the slightest business experience knows are
it should
signed without being read, contain an arbitration clause,
48
not be enforced against the recipient of the contract.

Second, the insured usually does not have the opportunity to
it
examine the policy until after he has made application-when 49
is either mailed to him or delivered by the company's agent.
Professor Patterson in Essentials of Insurance Law has pointed
out:
. . . the insured, because of his indifference to an event that will
probably never happen, and because of his inability to understand
the technical conditions imposed by the insurer, needs guidance
extent than in most other business deals
and protection to a greater
50
in which he engages.

Third, as emphasized by Morris Stone, an editor of the
Arbitration Journal, the uninsured motorist endorsement is
normally the least of what concerns the insured when he is
likely to pay little
shopping for insurance, and thus he is most
51
attention to it with its arbitration provision .
Fourth, it is a general rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed.5 2 The application of
this rule to the Uniform Arbitration Act and other "modern"
arbitration statutes seems justified by the following reasoning.
Historically, arbitration statutes were designed to modify, not
completely eliminate the special status of agreements to arbitrate
disputes;5 3 the Uniform Act seems equally clear that parties must
submit to arbitration by a voluntary agreement; therefore, as
long as terms in automobile insurance policies represent something much less than actual voluntary agreements, these terms
47. Id.

48. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding.
46 Harv. L. Rev. 1258, 1276 (1932-33).
49. A. Widiss, supra note 8, at 186.
50. E. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 44 (1935).
51. Stone, A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration, 21 Arb. J. 156, 157 (1966).
52. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, § 402 (1944).
53. A. Widiss, supra note 8, at 187.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

should not be taken as a voluntary agreement
abridging an
54
insured's right to a judicial determination.
Fifth, it is also submitted that silence on the part of the
purchaser after receiving the written policy containing the
arbitration terms should not be taken as agreement unless the
individual was both aware of the terms and understood their
importance.55 As has already been stated, in most instances the
individual is not only totally unaware of the provision, but would
not comprehend the import of the arbitration clause even if he
were to read it.
In light of the foregoing arguments it is submitted that in a
state with a "modern" arbitration statute like New Mexico,
neither the terms of the uninsured motorist endorsement which
include an arbitration provision nor the insured's apparent silent
acceptance of those terms constitute a voluntary, written agreement as contemplated by the Uniform Arbitration Act and
numerous court decisions. 56
The allocation of the burden of proof in the court hearing on
the question of whether there is a voluntary agreement to
arbitrate in the uninsured motorist endorsement may be determinative. The burden is usually on the party seeking to enforce the
agreement. 57 If the insurance company has this burden initially,
the question becomes whether the introduction into evidence of
the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist endorsement is
sufficient to shift the burden to the insured. If the insurer were
allowed to shift the burden in this manner, and ignorance of
these provisions is not allowed as a defense, then the insured
would be compelled to make his defense based upon the
involuntary nature of the purported agreement. 58 Thus, the issue
in terms of burden of proof is whether the insurer has to prove
the voluntary nature of the purported agreement, or whether the
insured has to prove the involuntary nature because the insurer's
burden is satisfied by the presence of the written arbitration
clause. It is believed that the complex character of the insurance
policy and the manner in which the policy is marketed are
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For a further general discussion involving the insurance contract as being a typical contract
of adhesion, see, Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U. L. Rev. 497
(1967-68); and Comments on Recent Important Tort Cases, 32 J. Am. Trial Lawyers Assoc.
344-46 (1968).
57. J. Appleman, Insurance Law in Practice. § 12094 (1962).
58. A. Widiss, supra note 8, at 195.
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excellent reasons which justify requiring the insurance company
to prove a knowledgeable acceptance of the arbitration terms by
the insured.
If it is the insured claimant who desires to compel arbitration
under the arbitration provision of an uninsured motorist endorsement, the arbitration clause should always be enforceable.
There is no doubt that the company's inclusion of the arbitration
provision is truly voluntary.5 9 It may be argued that enforcement
against the company could be attacked for lack of mutuality of
obligation. However, the situation is analogous to the treatment
accorded insurance policy provisions in cases of ambiguity,
where it is the generally accepted proposition that ambiguities in
a policy are to60 be construed in favor of the insured, and against
the company.
E. Conclusion.
It is submitted that an insurance policy represents neither an
agreement between parties to submit their disputes to arbitration
nor a knowledgeable waiver by the insured of his right to a jury
trial under the Uniform Arbitration Act. If, as seems evident, the
legislative purpose in the enactment of uninsured motorist
statutes such as N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-105 (Repl. 1972) is to
protect the insured, 61 then the arbitration provision of the
endorsement should not be forced upon an unwilling insured.
Alterations in the marketing practices of the insurance industry
could be introduced so that the terms of the endorsement would,
in fact, represent an actual voluntary agreement. At this time,
however, this has not occurred.
SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION PROVISION

The arbitration provision of the uninsured motorist coverage is
not a general agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising under the
coverage. By its terms it is limited to the issues of the liability of
the uninsured motorist to the insured and the amount of the
damages to which the insured is entitled. 62 This makes the clause
59.
60.
(1959).
61.
62.

Text at 221, supra.
J. Appleman, Insurance Law in Practice, § 7481 (1948); Couch, I Insurance 2d § 15:73-84
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, supra, note 14.
Text at 220 and note 2 supra.

234

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

particular rather than general 63 in that the parties have agreed
only to arbitrate these two issues.
A problem arises, however, in that issues other than those of
liability and damages are frequently'disputed in the adjustment
of an uninsured motorist claim. Such issues as the uninsured
status of the other motorist, the compliance by the insured with
policy conditions, the status of the person making the claim as an
insured under the policy, the applicability of "other insurance" 64
clauses and the question of the "hit-and-run" 65 vehicle must
frequently be determined. Such "coverage" questions are not
expressly covered by the arbitration provision, and the courts
have adopted varying positions as to the proper method for the
resolution of such issues.
Although no New Mexico appellate decision has considered
such coverage questions, the general rule appears to be that
coverage questions are not arbitrable and must be decided by the
courts. 66 This position is adopted by strictly construing the

63. Rosenbaum v. American Surety Co. of New York, II N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
64. "Other Insurance" clauses are normally inserted in casualty policies to apportion the
payment of a claim between overlapping insurance policies. The clause as found in the Family
Auto Policy reads as follows:
"Other insurance: With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall apply only as excess insurance
over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as
primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of
liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar insurance
available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the
higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Coverage applies
than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance."
65. The uninsured motorist coverage of the Family Automobile Policy defines a "hit-and-run"
vehicle as follows:
"'Hit-and-run-Automobile' means an automobile which causes bodily injury to an insured
arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which is
insured at the time of the accident, provided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such
'hit-and-run-automobile';
(b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within 24 hours to a
police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed
with the company within thirty days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal
representative has a cause or causes of action for damages against a person or persons whose
identity is unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support, thereof, and
(c) at the company's request the insured or legal representative makes available for inspection the
automobile which the insured was occupying at the time of the accident."
This clause has produced a great deal of litigation, especially in the area of the question of
physical contact between the insured auto and the "hit-and-run-automobile."
66. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Rossini, 14 Ariz. App. 235, 482 P.2d 484 (1971);
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provision as a particular agreement in accordance with the view
that the parties cannot be required to67arbitrate any issues which
they have not contracted to arbitrate. The normal procedure in
the jurisdictions following this rule is to stay the arbitration
proceeding pending a trial of the coverage questions.
However, one jurisdiction has varied this procedure while
adhering to the general rule. In Florida the courts have recognized that the coverage questions are to be determined by the
courts but have held that once the matter is brought to the court,
the court has jurisdiction to resolve all matters in dispute between
the parties. 68 This procedure, while effectively negating the
arbitration provision in such cases, does have the advantage of
preventing undue delay and expense which would otherwise be
involved in multiple proceedings.The Florida procedure would
seem to be preferable to jurisdictions which insist that coverage
questions must be determined by a court rather than the
arbitrator.
may
Several jurisdictions have held that the coverage questions
69 These
instance.
first
be determined by the arbitrator in the
decisions have been reached either by adopting a strained
70
construction of the language of the arbitration provision or by
placing the grounds for the decision upon71considerations of
public policy in avoiding multiple proceeding.
This position would appear to be preferable in that the parties
are allowed to proceed with the arbitration subject to review by
the courts, thus, providing a relatively quick resolution of the
dispute. In most cases this should work to the advantage of the
insured who is normally not in the same position as the insurer to
withstand the expense and delay of multiple proceedings. It is
(1969): Frager v. Pennsylvania
International Service Ins. Co. v. Ross, 169 Colo. 451, 457 P.2d 917
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 213
General Ins. Co. 155 Conn. 270, 231 A.d 531 (1967); Jones v. New
208, 245 N.E.2d 75 (1969);
App.2d
Ill.
105
Parker.
V.
Co.
Ins.
Safeway
1968);
(Fla.
502
So.2d
143 N.W.2d 572 (1966);
733,
App.
Mich.
3
Strange,
v.
Co.
Surety
Western Casualty and
183 N.E.2d 667 (1962);
310,
N.Y.2d
II
York,
New
of
Co.
Rosenbaum v. American Surety
518 (1963): Brummett v.
Murtaugh v. American States Ins. Co., 25 Ohio App.2d 106, 187 N.E.2d
A.L.R.3d 328 (1970);.
Grange Ins. Assoc., 4 Wash. App. 114, 479 P.2d 147 (1971): Annot. 29
286, 226 N.E.2d 808 (1966).
App.2d
Ohio
39
188,
Misc.
Ohio
10
Petrie,
v.
Ins.
Fireman's
Contra,
183 N.E.2d 667 (1962).
67. Rosenbaum v. American Surety Co. of New York, I I N.Y.2d 310,
68. Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1964).
Rptr. 556 (1965); Employers'
69. Jordan v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co.. 232 Cal App. 2d 127, 42 Cal.
Security Ins. Co. v.
Northwestern
(1965);
8
N.E.2d
205
627,
Mass.
348
Garney,
v.
Co.
Fire Ins.
Ohio App. 2d 286,
39
188,
Misc.
Ohio
10
Petrie,
v.
Ins.
Fireman's
1968);
(Nev.
Clark, 448 P.2d 39
A.2d 655 (1968).
244
67,
Pa.
431
Medycki,
v.
Co.
Ins.
Mutual
226 N.E.2d 808 (1966); Harleysville
187 N.E.2d 518 (1963).
Contra, Murtaugh v. American States Ins. Co., 25 Ohio App. 2d 106.
70. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
2d 8 (1965).
71. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Garney, 348 Mass. 627, 205 N.E.
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normally the insurer who attempts to delay the arbitration
proceeding pending the resolution of the coverage questions and
then to arbitrate the dispute. The delay involved in this procedure places increased pressure upon the insured to settle the
matter in order to avoid increased expense. 72
Whatever the position of the jurisdiction as to the interpretation of the arbitration provision, it is clear that the parties may
submit coverage questions to the arbitrators on a voluntary basis.
LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE

Either party to the insurance contract may lose the right to
arbitrate an uninsured motorist dispute. Such loss may occur
either as a result of the conduct of the parties or by agreement.
Where the parties agree to dispense with arbitration and to
litigate the dispute, the arbitration provision is terminated and
neither party should be able to successfully demand arbitration at
a later date.
The insurer has been held to have forfeited its right to arbitrate
the dispute where it has not made a timely demand for
arbitration. 7 3 What is a reasonable time for demanding arbitration will be determined on a case by case basis in the various
jurisdictions. This failure to demand arbitration is particularly
important when the arbitration provision is not mandatory but,
rather, depends upon the demand of a party to initiate the
arbitration process. 74
The insurer has also been held to have waived its right to insist
upon the arbitration of the dispute where it has answered a suit
brought by the insured. 75 In such cases the insurer is entitled to
move for a stay of the litigation in most jurisdictions76 and the
answer is construed as forfeiting the right to arbitrate. Where the
answer sets up a defense of the insured's failure to arbitrate the
courts are not in accord as to the forfeiture of the right to
arbitrate and differing results have been reached. 77
Lack of compliance by the insurer in the insured's attempts to
72. See generally, Phillip Hermann, Better Settlements Through Leverage,
205
73. Dickson v. Hoffman, 305 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Kan. 1969); Short v. Grange(1965).
Mut. Casualty
Co., 307 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W.Va. 1969); USF&G v. Williams, 177 So.2d
47 (Fla. 1965); Poray v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 454,217 A.2d 916 (1966).
74. Andeen v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 70 II1.App.2d 357, 217 N.E.2d 814(1966).
75. Schramm v. Dotz, 23 Wis.2d 678, 127 N.W.2d 779 (1964).
76. Uniform Arbitration Act § 2d (1955 version): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-IOD
(Supp. 1971).
77. Chernick v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 8 App. Div.2d 264, 187 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1959),
aff'd. 8 N.Y.2d 756, 168 N.E.2d 110, 201 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960).
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arbitrate have also been construed as a forfeiture of the right to
arbitrate the dispute. Thus, where the insurer had not joined the
Accident Claims Tribunal, thus, increasing the cost of arbitration
to the insured 78 the court found that the right to arbitrate had
been lost. The same result has been reached where the insurer
arbitration. 79
refused to respond to the request of the insured for
Some courts have held that where the insurer has denied
coverage under the policy, the right to arbitrate the dispute has
been forfeited since the insured could go to court on the coverage
question with the court taking jurisdiction of all of the issues in
80
dispute between the parties. However, a mere denial of liability
(as opposed to coverage) will ordinarily not forfeit the right to
arbitrate .81
by bringing an
The insured may forfeit the right to arbitrate
82 although a contrary
action against the uninsured motorist, 8 3
The right, of the
result has been reached in several cases.
be lost by bringing an action on the
insured to arbitrate will also
8 4 or by releasing the other motorist. 85
policy against the insurer
The rules as to the forfeiture of the right to arbitrate, while
varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, consititute an important
area of inquiry for the attorney in the handling of an uninsured
motorist claim and should be reviewed carefully in each case.
EVALUATION OF THE USE OF ARBITRATION

As pointed out by Phillip Hermann in Better Settlements
through Leverage,8 6 both plaintiffs and defendants must consider
their costs when deciding whether to settle or litigate an action.
Where settlement is not feasible and the cost of litigation
prohibitive in proportion to an insured's assets or potential
recovery, the arbitral process may provide a desired third
alternative. In fact, one member of the plaintiff's bar has
78. Hall v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 180 So.2d 224 (Fla. 1966).
79. Bielski v. Wolverine Ins. Co.. 379 Mich. 280, 150 N.W.2d 788 (1967).
(1970); American
80. Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co.. 12 Ariz. App.2d, 467 P.2d 77
1967).
(Fla.
850
So.2d
198
Daniel.
v.
Co.
Ins.
Southern
St. Paul
81. Riley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970); Niazi v.
Mercury Ins. Co.. 265 Minn. 222. 121 N.W.2d 349 (1963).
82. Scheck v. MVAIC. 40 Misc.2d 575, 243 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1963).
of Travelers
83. Mailman v. MVAIC, 36 Misc.2d 825, 235 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1962): Application
(1962).
718
N.Y.S.2d
235
Co.,
Indemnity
16 App.
84. Dickson v. Hoffman. 305 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Kan. 1969): McCarthy v. MVAIC,
101 (1963).
Div.2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962). aff'd 12 N.Y.2d 922, 198 N.E.2d 405. 238 N.Y.S.2d
85: Commercial Ins. Co. v. Copeland. 248 Cal. App.2d 561. 56 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1967).
86. P. Hermann, supra note 72.
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indicated to the author that he considers arbitration the only
feasible method of obtaining a day in court for his client
in
smaller personal injury cases. 87
For the uninsured motorists' claimant, however, the decision to
arbitrate is best made on a case by case basis. As a result, it is not
surprising that such claimants have chosen to attack the mandatory arbitration provision of the uninsured motorist coverage
on
numerous occasions when it appeared in their best interest to
do
so.
A. Reasons favoring use of arbitrationby insured under Rules
of
the A merican ArbitrationAssociation.
In most cases (at least in those where the injured insured has
incurred less than $2,000.00 of medical expenses) 88 it is believed
that it will be to the advantage of the insured claimant to resolve
any dispute with his insurer by arbitration if the arbitration is
in
accord with the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association.
The first consideration is cost. Many courts have expressly
stated that arbitration is inexpensive when compared to court
litigation.89 The filing fee of an American Arbitration Association
87. Interview with Turner Branch, Attorney at Law in the law
firm of Branch & Dickson in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, October, 1971.
88. The figure of $2,000.00 is not the total claim the insured claimant
may have because it does
not include property damage to the automobile or pain and suffering.
Including these latter two
items of damages, the total claim could well be $10,000.00,
which is the limit of liability per
person under most uninsured motorist endorsements.
The figure of $2,000.00 was selected because it is 25 percent
of an average annual income of
$8,000.00. It is believed by the author that claims under the
uninsured motorist endorsement
involving more than $2,000.00 out of pocket medical expenses
are so serious that the injured
claimant should always be able to protect his rights by suing in
court.
A survey was made on April 26, 1972, of four major insurance
company claims managers and
adjusters in Albuquerque, New Mexico concerning the number
of uninsured motorist cases that
would not be litigated in court if all claimants with out of pocket
expenses of under $2,000.00
arbitrated their differences with their insurers. The results are
as follows: Tom Jetter, Claims
Manager of U.S.F.&G. Insurance Company stated that "the great
majority" of uninsured motorist
cases would be kept out of court; Dennis Depies, casualty
examiner of Allstate Insurance
Company stated that at least 90 percent of uninsured motorist
cases would be kept out of court;
Ed Foree, claims manager of State Farm Insurance Company
stated that more than 75 percent of
uninsured motorist cases would be kept out of court; and Jim Grindstaff,
chief adjuster for Safeco
Insurance Company, stated that at least 95 percent of uninsured
motorist cases would be kept out
of court. From a public policy standpoint therefore, it is asserted
that the policy urged by the
author for claimant's attorneys in uninsured motorist cases would
greatly reduce the problem of
court congestion.
89. Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 420 F.2d
1372 (6th Cir. 1970); Van Horn
v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1968):
Bohlman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 171
So.2d 23 (Fla. 1965); Riverton Valley Elec. Assn. v. Pacific Power
1964). See also Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist, 515 Ins. L. J. 711, & L. Co., 391 P.2d 489 (Wyo.
715 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Pretzelj.
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uninsured motorist case is $50 paid by the filing party and a $100
surcharge paid by the insurance company. 90 A contributing
factor to lower arbitration costs under the American Arbitration
Association than under other schemes of arbitration is the fact
that AAA regional offices have been able to obtain free services
of qualified negligence attorneys to serve as arbitrators.
There are good reasons not to compensate arbitrators. Attorneys who have been asked by the AAA to be on its uninsured
motorist panels 9 ' have found this situation satisfactory. 9 2 Uninsured motorist arbitrations typically take only a few hours, and
the attorneys are never asked to be arbitrators more than two or
three times a year. 93 Many lawyers also see in their service as
arbitrators an opportunity to supply an important public service
to the community. If private arbitration were not available to
dispose of these claims at a reasonable cost, there would either be
no remedy for the motorist who is injured by an uninsured driver
or else thousands of such claims would be thrown upon an
already congested court system. Another reason for not compensating arbitrators is to insure their independence. 94 If an attorney
arbitrator is not receiving a fee, he has no pecuniary reason to
award one way or the other. More specifically, since the
insurance company is always a party, he would have no reason to
satisfy the company with awards so that they would not be likely
to challenge him.
Although it has been argued that attorneys spend just as much
time preparing for an arbitration as for a court case 95 and that
96
it is
arbitration costs are actually higher than court costs,

submitted that the total cost to the client of arbitration is much
less than the total cost of court litigation due to the speed of
arbitration. Speed is thus a second major consideration. Courts
frequently have endorsed the use of arbitration because it is
quick. 97 In metropolitan areas it often entails a delay of three
90. Aksen, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 20 Fed. Ins. Counset Q. 56, 71 (1969-70).
91. Text at 242. infra.
92. Aksen, supra note 90 at 76-78.
93. Id. Interview with Turner Branch, Attorney at Law in the law firm of Branch & Dickson in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, February 23, 1972; Interview with Richard F. La Roche in the law
firm of Smith & Ransom in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 18, 1972. Both Turner Branch and
Richard F. La Roche are arbitrators on the American Arbitration Association's Uninsured
Motorist Panel.
94. Aksen, supra note 90, at 78.
95. Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1967, at 1.
96. Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist, supra note 89, at 711.
97. Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra note 89; Norton v. Allstate Ins.
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years or longer between the time a court action is filed and the
time the case is decided; 98 whereas,use of arbitration to resolve
the same claims is often completed within eight weeks from the
time a request for arbitration is filed. 99 A survey of the situation
in Illinois in 1965 disclosed that the average time between the
filing of a case with an AAA regional office and receiving a
decision from the arbitrator was fourteen weeks, as compared to
an average of over five years for handling comparable cases in
Cook County. 100 Thus, arbitration is a very attractive option
when a prompt resolution is particularly desirable to the small
personal injury claimant.
A third consideration involves the award of the arbitrator. It
has been suggested that one of the reasons the insurance industry
selected the arbitral process was its hope that arbitrators would
give more "reasonable" (lower) awards than juries. 101 This hope
has largely been frustrated, however. Some of the major differences between an arbitration award and a jury verdict include: 102
I. There is usually no defendant in the uninsured motorist
hearing. A typical uninsured or hit-and-run driver does not make a
very credible witness.
2. Defense counsels are usually restricted to cross examination to
prove their case.
3. Both court decisions and legislation have taken a view of
uninsured motorist protection that favors the policyholder.
4. While the claimant is an adversary in the hearing, it is still
obvious that he is a premium paying customer of the insurer. He is
not the stranger that is found in the third party action in court.

Recently, the Columbia Project for Effective Justice completed a
three year study of AAA uninsured motorist arbitrations.103
Co., 226 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Loring, 91 Ill. App.2d
418, 235 N.E.2d 418 (1968); New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. Lake Patagonia Recreation Assoc.,
Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 18, 467 P.2d 88, 96 (1970).
98. A. Levin & E. Wooley, Dispatch and Delay, A Field Study of Judicial Administration in
Pennsylvania (1961); H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, & B. Burchholz, Delay in the Court (1959): Warren,
The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 Am. Bar. Assn. J. 1048 (1958);
Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1(1961).
99. Aksen, Arbitration under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 504 Ins. L. J. 17 at 24
(1965); Interview with Turner Branch, Attorney at Law in the law firm of Branch & Dickson in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, February 28, 1972; Interview with Richard F. La Roche in the law
firm of Smith & Ransom in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 18, 1972.
100. Pretzel, supra note 89 at 714.
101. Id. at 712; Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 661 at 669-76 (1963).
102. Aksen, supra note 90, at 72.
103. Columbia University Project for Effective Justice, address to American Arbitration
Association Law Committee, Insurance Division, delivered by Paul A. Stone at 9.
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While their findings have not yet been published, a preliminary
report made to the AAA's Law Committee is relevant:
The data obtained in this study indicated that the quality of an
arbitration hearing as seen by the arbitrator is as good as, or better
than, the quality of a court trial as seen by the judge. As far as the
attorneys' views are concerned, we do not have comparative data,
but the incidence of dissatisfaction is very low and the opinion that
arbitration is suitable for adjudication of some personal injury
cases is very widely shared. On the average, the result obtained in
case would be
the arbitration of a moderate-sized personal 1injury
04
the same as though it were tried before a jury.

Thomas J. Casey, Vice President of Claims of Allstate Insurance Company, has stated some impressive statistics that indicate
that arbitration is more favorable to the insured than court
litigation. 105 Of the 21,668 uninsured motorist claims by his
company in 1968 (excluding New York), Casey explains that
1,611 were submitted to arbitration. In seven of the larger
regional offices of Allstate in this year 933 claims in arbitration
were concluded by an award by the arbitrator; 29 were settled
while arbitration was in process; 626 were settled before the
arbitration began; 64 arbitrations were dropped. Of the 214 cases
that proceeded all the way through the arbitral process, the
arbitrator ruled in 42 that there was no liability and in 172 that
there was liability. In terms of percentages this is equivalent to a
ruling in 19% of the cases in favor of the company and in 81% in
favor of the insured. This experience, Casey concludes, is more
heavily balanced in favor of the claimant than is the suit
experience under the bodily injury coverage in the Uninsured
Motorist area because his company's suit experience shows that
approximately 48.7% of the cases are won on the basis of no
liability and an additional 18.4% are considered as won since the
are less than the last settlement offer by the
damages awarded
10 6
company.
Several commentators have noted that the reason awards in
104. Aksen, supra note 90, at 73. For a fuller treatment of the findings of the Columbia Project,
an
see, Aksen, Arbitration of A utomobile A ccident Cases, I Conn. L. Rev. 70 at 80-90 (1968). For
opinion of two claimants' attorneys the author interviewed Turner Branch and Richard F. La
Roche, supra note 93.
105. Casey, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 20 Fed. Ins. Counsel Q. 56, 65 (1969-70).
106. The status report on uninsured motorist claims filed with the AAA from the State of New
Mexico is as follows:
Settled Withdrawn Pending
Awarded
Total
0
1
12
10
23
1970
7
2
11
12
32
1971
Arizona.
Phoenix,
AAA,
Paul A. Newnham, Southwest Regional Director,
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uninsured motorist arbitration are more often given to insureds is
that there are more attorneys eligible to serve as arbitrators who
have made their living suing insurers than defending them. 107
Paul Pretzel has quoted the results of a survey of 500 cases that
were arbitrated. 08 In 304 cases the arbitrators were plaintiff's
attorneys; in 57 cases the arbitrators were members of the
defense bar. The study is also quoted as depicting the average
award made by the plaintiffs' lawyers as being 25% higher than
the award of the arbitrators who were classed as defense
lawyers. 109
A fourth major consideration is the procedure used in arbitrating Uninsured Motorist claims. The unique advantages of the
AAA arbitrations to the insured are contained in the uniform
rules and procedure found in all 50 states. 110 When a claimant
files a demand for arbitration with an AAA tribunal clerk, a copy
of the demand is sent to the opposing party for an answer."'
Then comes the most important stage in the arbitration process
-the selection of the arbitrator. This attorney is selected from an
accident claims panel maintained by the AAA," 2 and he must be
agreed upon by both parties. 113 Either party can object as often
as he wants until an attorney is finally agreed upon. 114 Today the
AAA maintains on its accident claims panels lawyers who are
truly knowledgable in negligence law and practice."15 In this way
the parties can be assured that the arbitrator is a person who has
the technical competence to determine legal liability and damages in a field of law with which he is completely conversant.
To assure the AAA that the arbitrators are indeed men of
knowledge, experience and impartiality, the AAA has established
an ad hoc screening committee in each of its major cities to help
advise each regional office on the qualifications of attorneys
107. Hapner, A Dozen Problems in Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Claims Under American
Arbitration Association Rules, 34 Ins. Counsel J. 92, 96 (1967); Pretzel, supra, note 89; Casey, supra
note 105, at 66.
108. Pretzel, supra note 89.
109. An analysis of the New Mexico Accident Claims Advisory Committee of the AAA in
Albuquerque, New Mexico does not show a substantially greater number of plaintiff's lawyers.
However, there is a larger number of plaintiff's lawyers that defendant's lawyers, and undoubtedly
this fact would increase a claimant's chances of getting a plaintiff's lawyer as arbitrator.
I 0. American Arbitration Association, Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Tribunal Rules].
Ill. Tribunal Rules, § 4.
112. Tribunal Rules, § 3.
113. Tribunal Rules, § 8.
114. Id.
115. Aksen, supra note 90, at 73.
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additional qualified lawyers
within that region and to nominate
116
panel.
to the accident claims
It has been argued that two serious pitfalls in the arbitration
process are: 1) that there is no burden of proof and therefore the
117
burden is upon each party to establish his defense or claim;
and, 2) that the rules of evidence are not applied.118 Actually, this
fact seems to be to the advantage of the claimant because he can
more easily present his case. It is conceded by several Albuquerque trial lawyers that the fact that the rules of evidence are not
strictly applied is a benefit because in some cases these rules are
purely obstructionist." 9 In any event, since all arbitrators are
attorneys and since they are thoroughly experienced as trial
attorneys in negligence practice themselves, it is asserted that no
real difference results. In a discussion between three Albuquerque arbitrators and the author on this point, it was noted that all
of them assume that they have the ability to accept evidence for
"what it is worth" in order to keep the hearings proceeding while
matter according to the local
nevertheless actually deciding the
120
apply.
that
law
rules of evidence
The lawyer's preparation for the arbitration hearing, while
somewhat different in its emphasis, should be no less thorough
than that which he would undertake in preparing for a court trial.
The necessity for mastering the factual details of the case is no
less important in arbitration. The main emphasis of the arbitration preparation should be placed on development of facts. The
arbitrator will base his award upon the factual determinations he
reaches. Like court litigation, the lawyer should obtain expert
opinions concerning the issues in dispute, preserve physical
evidence, obtain statements from witnesses, and, in general, fully
develop the case. Finally, under Section 7 of the Uniform
Arbitration Act,' 2 ' the parties are entitled to the issuance of
116. Id. at 74-75.
117. Hapner, supra note 107.
118. Pretzel, supra, note 89, at 719. For instance, it has been held that statements given by
insureds to companies (admissible in arbitration) are privileged aiid cannot be reached in a
district court taking an appeal "de novo" from arbitration. People v. Ryan. 30 1ll.2d 456, 197
N.E.2d 15 (1964). See also, Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule. 524 Ins. L. J. 531
(1966); Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 524 Ins. L. J. 545 (1966).
119. Interviews with Turner Branch and Richard F. La Roche, supra note 93; Interview with
Roland Kool, Attorney at Law in the law firm of Kool, Kool & Bloomfield in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, March 21, 1972.
120. Interviews with Turner Branch and Richard F. La Roche, supra note 93; Interview with
Fred Hart, Dean of the University of New Mexico School of Law in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
February 24, 1972.
121. Uniform Arbitration Act §7 (1955 version): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-15 (Supp. 1971).
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subpoenas and depositions. The subpoena power extends to the
production of books, records, documents and other evidence. The
correct procedure is to direct the request for the subpoena to the
AAA regional office, who in turn sends the request to the
arbitrator.
The arbitration hearing is essentially an adversary proceeding.
The parties are entitled to opening statements, introduction of
documents, examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
presentation of exhibits, and final summations. 122 The claimant is
usually heard first. Because the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied, objections should go to the weight of the evidence and
not to its admissiblity. Therefore, the lawyer should make every
effort to anticipate the argument of the other party with a view to
countering, rather than excluding it. It is the strength of the
party's own case rather than the weakness of his opponent's
which is the important factor in the arbitration process. Lastly, it
is noted that arbitrators often require written briefs on points of
23
law.1
After the close of the hearing, the arbitrator has thirty days in
which to render his award. 124 He is not required to render a
written opinion or explain the reasons for the award. As we will
note later this is a possible defect in the arbitral process. Once the
award has been given, voluntary compliance with its terms by the
parties normally disposes of the matter. Under Section 11 of the
Uniform Arbitration Act 125 the award may be confirmed as a
judgment upon the application of a party unless some objection
is filed within ninety days.
Section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act 126 provides five
grounds upon which an award may be vacated upon the
application of a party within ninety days of the delivery of his
copy of the award. Section 13127 provides for the modification or
correction of an award upon a similar application. These
applications are made by motion to the court and are served in
the manner prescribed by law for the service of complaints.
Lastly, a party may appeal from any of these orders, or from an
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Uniform
Tribunal
Tribunal
Uniform
Uniform
Uniform

Arbitration
Rules, § 22.
Rules, § 28.
Arbitration
Arbitration
Arbitration

Act § 5b (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-13b (Supp. 1971).
Act § 11 ( 1955 version): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-19 (Supp. 1971).
Act § 12 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-20 (Supp. 1971).
Act § 13 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-21 (Supp. 1971).
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order to stay either an action or an arbitration hearing
128
jurisdiction.
the
in
appeals
civil
for
manner prescribed
A fifth policy consideration, one that is often favored by courts,
is that arbitration helps reduce the case load in courts. 129 Robert
Coulson, current president of the American Arbitration Association, has stated that the arbitration clause facilitates quick
settlement of claims, a policy favored by the law, because both
parties are aware of the fact that they will be forced into quick
arbitration if they do not settle. 130 As stated previously, 131 quick
settlement of the Uninsured Motorist claim is often advantageous
to the insured because he will have little cost.
The sixth and final consideration to be made in deciding
whether to use AAA arbitration is the comparison between AAA
arbitration as has been set forth with arbitration under other
systems. Although the AAA has been the primary administrator
of uninsured motorist arbitrations, it has not been the sole agency
utilized by the insurers to arbitrate uninsured motorist claims. A
few companies have employed an ad hoc system specified in the
Uninsured Motorist endorsement which calls for a tripartite
panel of paid arbitrators. The most notable company using this
system is State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. It
the
is suggested that arbitration under the AAA is better for
132
reasons:
following
the
for
systems
other
insured than those
1. The AAA offers a uniform set of rules nationwide that are
known to the parties. The other systems do not.
2. Through the AAA, the public and the insurance industry
are afforded impartial administration by a disinterested nonprofit corporation so that complete integrity of the adjudicative
process can be assured.
3. The AAA provides administration so that the parties
themselves need not be burdened with all the miniscule tasks that
necessarily accrue in choosing arbitrators, setting dates for
128. Uniform Arbitration Act $ 19 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 22-3-27 (Supp. 1971).
129. Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.. 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970): Van
Horn v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.. 391 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1968); Norton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 226
F.Supp. 373 (E.D. Mich. 1964); New Pueblo Constructors. Inc. v. Lake Patagonia Recreation
Assoc., Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 18, 467 P.2d 88, 96 (1970); Bohlman v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 171 So.2d 23
(Fla. 1965); Riverton Valley Elec. Assn. v. Pacific Power & L. Co., 391 P.2d 489 (Wyo. 1964);
School District No. 46 v. Del Bianco. 68 Ill. App.2d 145, 215 N.E.2d 25 (1966).
130. Coulson, Voluntary Arbitration-"Rapid Transit" Settlements of Casualty Claims, 508 Ins.

L. J. 280, 281 (1965).
131. Text at 235, supra.
132. Aksen, supra note 90 at 75-76.
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hearings, obtaining hearing rooms, sending out notices of
hearings, postponements, cancellations, etc. The other systems do
not do this.
4. The AAA chooses a single neutral arbitrator to hear and
determine the uninsured motorist claim. By comparison the ad
hoc system utilized by State Farm calls for a tripartite board of
arbitrators wherein each party selects one and the two so selected
then choose a third neutral. The tri-partite system of arbitration
in addition to adding delays to the process also becomes
expensive when all three arbitrators are compensated.
5. Under the prevailing State Farm policy the insured and the
insurer divide the costs of arbitration fees equally so that the
insured has a higher threshold to overcome before he can get to
133
arbitration.
6. The State Farm policy maintains that local rules of
evidence shall apply in contrast to the AAA rules.
7. Under the AAA rules procedure is available to appoint an
arbitrator promptly. Under the tripartite system, if the parties
cannot agree to the selection of an arbitrator it requires one or
the other to apply to court to appoint an arbitrator. This is
unsatisfactory because the cost is increased and because the
object of speedy arbitration is usurped by having the courts get
involved.
8. The last major difference is that AAA arbitrators volunteer
3 4
their services without compensation.1
In summary, it is believed that the claimant under a State
Farm Uninsured Motorist endorsement has more reason to seek
avoidance of the arbitration clause than the claimant under the
AAA arbitration clause, even when his out-of-pocket medical
expenses are less than $2,000.00. Gerald Aksen, general counsel
for the AAA has stated:
Our records indicate that the average total cost for arbitration fees
and expenses is $155 per case ($50 paid by the insured and balance
paid by insurer); whereas it has been reliably reported to me that
the three-man system averages a cost of $700 per case just for
135
arbitration fees and expenses.
133. Text at 246, infra.
134. Text at 239, supra.
135. Aksen, supra, note 90 at 78.
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B. Reasons not favoring use of arbitrationby insured under Rules
of the American ArbitrationAssociation.
A major reason against the use of any form of arbitration for
uninsured motorist claims is the existence of a state statute like
the one in New Mexico allowing the loser in an uninsured
motorist arbitration proceeding the right to appeal to the district
court for a trial de novo. 136 The arguments is that the losing party
will often desire to appeal for a trial de novo; therefore,
proceeding to trial in the first place will both save unnecessary
cost and court time and prevent a multiplicity of suits.137 A
contributing reason for this is that only the issues of liability of
the uninsured motorist and damages to the injured claimant are
proper subjects of arbitration and that many other issues are
subject to court litigation in the first place. 138
In opposition to the preceding argument it is believed that such
trial de novo statutes should be reviewed in light of current
statutory law and the normally prompt resolution of uninsured
motorist disputes under the Uniform Arbitration Act and other
modern statutes. The New Mexico trial de novo statute had been
enacted in the 1969 New Mexico legislative session so that
uninsured motorist arbitration provisions would be enforced
under New Mexico's old arbitration statute. It was believed by
the legislators who enacted this statute that its existence would
insure that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist
endorsement would not be contrary to existing public policy
because courts would not be ousted of their jurisdiction. 139 With
the passage of the Uniform Arbitration Act in the 1971 New
Mexico legislative session, there is now no need for the de novo
statute. It should be repealed.1 40
In states without a trial de novo statute 141 the finality of the
arbitration award is another possible liability of the arbitral
process to the insured claimant. Under Section 12 of the Uniform
136. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-107 (Repl. 1972).
137. See, Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965).
138. Text at 233, supra.
139. Interview with Turner Branch, supra note 93. See also the opinions of Judge Musgrove
and the late Judge Reidy. text at 224, supra.
140. In an interview with Turner Branch, supra note 93, Mr. Branch a New Mexico legislator,
stated that there would be a movement in the coming session of the New Mexico legislature to
repeal N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-107 (Repl. 1972) because it is inconsistent with the policy of the
Uniform Arbiration Act.
141. The vast majority of states fall into this category.
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Arbitration Act, 142 a party has a right to appeal an arbitrator's
award only if he alleges that the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue means; that there was evident
partiality by the arbitrator; that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers; that the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause; or, if there was no arbitration agreement, the
issue was not adversely determined by a court. Furthermore,
under Section 13 of the Uniform Act, 143 a party has a right to
have a court modify or correct the award only where there was
evident miscalculation of figures or other evident mistake, where
the arbitrator awarded upon a matter not submitted to him, or
where the award is imperfect in form. While these constitute a
variety of grounds for vacating and modifying or correcting an
award, it is obvious that these elements will not be involved in
most cases.
While thus far the number of appellate decisions involving
issues concerning review of arbitrator's awards is not great, the
volume of cases is now increasing. 144 The holding of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Great American Insurance Co. v.
American Arbitration Association illustrates the approach most
often taken by courts on this issue: "The misconduct necessary to
a mere mistake of law, nor
overturn an arbitrator's action is not
45
even several mistakes aggregated.'
There are now, however, a number of cases where arbitration
decisions have been vacated for a variety of reasons. For
example, where an appellate court was convinced that the
arbitrator failed to regard medical testimony in the determination
of the loss of future earnings, the court decided that even though
such conduct "may not have constituted fraud, misconduct,
corruption or some other irregularity 'of this nature,' yet it was
conduct which amounted to a denial of a full and fair
hearing. . . ." such that the award should be vacated and the
case remanded to be heard by another arbitrator. (Emphasis
added.) 146 In light of recent decisions like the foregoing it is
142. Uniform Arbitration Act $ 12 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. 22-3-20 (Supp. 1971).
143. Uniform Arbitration Act $ 13 (1955 version); N.M. Stat. Ann. §.22-3-21 (Supp. 1971).
144. Alan Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage 118 (Supp. 1971-72): "The
opinions primarily eminate from courts in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and
Pennsylvania."
145. Great American Ins. Co. v. American Arbitration Assoc., 436 Pa. 370, 260 A.2d 769, 770
(1970).

146. Smaligo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 432 Pa. 133, 247 A.2d 577, 580 (1968). See also
Brewer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ore. 558, 436 P.2d 547 (1968); Allen v. Interinsurance Exchange of
Automobile Club of So. Calif., 275 Cal. App.2d 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. 247, 248 (1969).
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asserted that the decision of an arbitrator in an uninsured
motorist case may not be as unassailable as was once thought.
In any event the criticism of arbitration due to its finality is of
little importance, for under the proposal of the author 147 the
insured claimant would only seek arbitration for the less serious
claims. For these claims the policy favoring the finality of
arbitration is strong, and this actually operates to the advantage
of the insured because statistics show that he wins in the vast
148
majority of the cases.
A third possible defect in the arbitration process is the fact that
the arbitrator does not have to render an opinion. In view of the
advantages of arbitration stated herein, however, it is felt that in
most cases this defect is relatively minor.
A final problem is that of possible inconsistencies in result
stemming from the fact that two tribunals decide the same issues
of law and fact. For instance, arbitration may impose liability on
the insurer whereas a jury may not find liability against the
uninsured motorist in a suit by him against the insured. Also, if
the insurer has a subrogation right, he may lose the right to
collect from the uninsured motorist at trial after being held liable
to the insured in arbitration. 149 Although this is a legitimate fault
with the arbitral process from the standpoint of the insurer, it
does not seem to pose any problems for the insured claimant.

CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that attorneys who are unfamiliar with
arbitration and are biased in favor of the judicial process
invariably choose determination by a judge or jury rather than
arbitration. 150 It is also possible that the reader might conclude
from the amount of space that has been devoted to the question
of enforceability of the arbitration clause and the problems with
respect to a restricted scope of arbitration that the author
manifests a hostile attitude toward the use of arbitration. In light
of the foregoing arguments, however, it is suggested that there
147. Text at page 238 and supra note 88.
148. Text at 241, supra.
149. Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California'sLatest Answer to the Problem ofthe

FinanciallyIrresponsibleMotorist, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 516, 532-34 (1960).
150. King, Arbitration ofAutomobile Accident Claims, 14 Fla. L. Rev. 328. 334 (1962): A poll
of Florida attorneys indicated that "over 50% had a poor opinion of Arbitration." See also,
Arbruse, Arbitration and the Uninsured Motorist Provision, 37 Fla. Bar.J. 283 (1963).
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are many advantages to the insured claimant in the use of
arbitration. More particularly, when he has suffered out of pocket
losses of less thatn $2,000.00 as the result of a collison with an
uninsured motorist, the insured should usually seek to solve any
differences with his insurer by arbitration.
CHARLES ANTHONY SHAW

